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In most developing countries civil servants are responsible for 
decreasing infant mortality, improving education outcomes 
etc. Understanding how bureaucratic systems can incentivise 
civil servants for public service delivery is an important yet 
under-investigated question in economic development. In this 
paper I investigate one such system i.e. the initial allocation of 
civil servants to varying seniority of first set of colleagues (co-
workers and supervisors) and test how that shapes long run 
outcomes for newly recruited civil servants. I exploit a source 
of exogenous variation in initial placement of the new recruits 
induced by the Tenure/Transfer Policy of the government 
of the Punjab in Pakistan. I under-take a largescale data 
digitisation exercise to construct a civil servant - month 
panel dataset from 1983- 2013. I find that as colleagues at 
the entry-level job become more senior, newly recruited civil 
servants collect more taxes on average. It, however, leads to 
an increase in the dispersion of the tax collection distribution, 
with the high ability civil servants collecting more and the low 
ability collecting less taxes. Seniority of the first colleagues 
also improves the allocation of talent within the bureaucracy. 
As colleagues at the entry-level job become senior in the 
organisation they promote and laterally move only the high 
ability civil servants. Moreover, these civil servants are laterally 
moved to jobs that are harder to perform in. A simple and 
inexpensive policy implication would be to maximise job 
rotation of new recruits on entering the organisation.
